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EVASION AND AVOIDANCE OF USURY LAWS
JACKSON R. COLLINS*
The problem of usury in its various forms is described in the earliest records of
mankind. Any compensation for the use of money was usury in Biblical times and
the ipedieval Church held that such usury was in violation of its doctrine and tedch-
ings. It might be noted in passing, however, that in the parable of the talents (Mat-
thew XXV:I 4) the placing of money for hire was approved. At the time of the
American Declaration of Independence, reasonable compensation for the use, for-
bearance or detention of money was the dommercial custom and approved by the
statutes of England and the various colonies. The statutes limiting compensation for
the use of money became known as usury laws. Compensation for the use of money
is now known among us as "interest." The taking of an unlawful excess over and
above the amount of compensation permitted by statute throughout America is
known as "usury." Throughout this paper we are primarily studying ways and
means of taking a lawful or unlawful excess as compensation for the use, forbearance
or detention of money.
Avoidance is a lawful act or deed which is accomplished by acting within the law.
Evasion is a violation of law, a cutting of corners or an illegal hurdling of legal
barriers, and constitutes a wrongful or illegal act. Passing through a loophole in im-
perfect legislation is avoidance, while giving an untrue meaning to a colorable lending
transactioh is evasion. The difference between avoidance and evasion of law can be
illustrated graphically by the analogy of a barrier across a city street. If the pedestrian
crawls through or over the barrier, that 'would be evasion; if, however, he turned
and went around one or the other of the city blocks adjoining and reached the other
side of the barrier by unbarricaded open streets, it would be avoidance. Such is the
content and meaning of these two words as used in this paper, It should not be
thought that the term "avoidance" necessarily carries any opprobrium with it.
Whether it does or not will depend upon the proximity to law-breaking which the
particular fact situation reveals.
Webb's treatise on usury states that there are four elements to every act of usury,
and many authorities claim there is another element, namely, intention. The four
necessary elements are: (i) a loan; (2) a fixed obligation to pay; (3) a certain amount
due; (4) an excess of compensation beyond that permitted by statute.
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In England there has been no usury statute for many years, and there the wrong
of usury consists of "an unconscionable agreement" to pay an unreasonable compen-
sation for a loan. The American usury problem in the courts does not involve such
ethical questions as to what is "conscionable" or "unconscionable." It is restricted to
measuring the compensation contracted for, paid or received upon a loan, and
whither that compensation falls within maximum limits permitted by the statute
against which it is measured.
In order to measure the compensation, it must be reduced to a common de-
nominator which is arrived at by considering the amount of the loan, the period of
time lent (generally on an annual basis), the amount of compensation for the use,
forbearance or detention-the relationship being expressed in a percentage. The
formula may be expressed: amount of compensation placed on time basis (generally
a year), divided by amount of loan, yields the annual percentage received. If the
percentage received or contracted for is within the statutory maximum of the usury
statute, then only lawful interest has been received; but if there is any excess above
the permitted maximum of the statute, then there is usury or an illegal charge.
Ever since interest was judicially recognized as lawful when within reasonable
limits, numerous efforts have been sought to avoid or overcome those limitations.
Much skill and thought have been expended in that effort. The inability to get by
that limitation was well expressed by Lord Mansfield in Floyer v. Edwards2 in the
following famous quotation:
"Where the real truth is a loan of money, the wit of man cannot find a shift to take it
out of the statute."
In spite of this dear statement more than 150 years ago, efforts to "find a shift" have
continued till the present moment.
EVASIONS
It has often been said that usury is the bargain struck between need and greed.
If these two forces are unrestrained, then the law does not worry either party. Only
as they are tempered are the stark realities concealed and clothed in the habitual
vesture of the parties.
Short term loans in small amounts or midget loans.
' The most notorious of usu'rers in modern city life are the "five for six boys" in the
larger cities. The designation grows out of the practice of making loans of $5 for
a week or two weeks and exacting a promise to repay $6. No interest rate is stated.
By reputation these lenders are generally gangsters or racketeers who readily admit
their business is illegal, and who enforce their contracts by fear of brute force.3
They are "vest pocket" lenders with no office, existing in every large size town of
America. The motion pictures of their activities place their locations at cigar stands
I Cowp. 112 (1774).
'People v. Faden, 271 N. Y. 435, 3 N. E. (2d) 584 (1936), afl'g 247 App. Div. 777, 86 N. Y. S. 405
(1936); People v. Blumenthal, 157 Misc. 943, 284 N. Y. S. 873 (1936).
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and lobbies in big office buildings, or merely show a man with a slouch hat on a
street corner.
There is another kind of lender of small sums for a short term. He is the foreman
in an industrial plant, or even a minor employee in such an establishment, who by
nature drifts into the business of lending to his fellow employees till the next pay
day.
Side agreements.
The use of side agreements occurs in Minnesota and in most towns of the North-
west from St. Paul to Seattle. Under these the lender makes one loan but takes two
instruments, each lawful on its face. The illegality is only ascertained by getting the
surrounding facts by- parol evidence and putting the two instruments together as
different parts of the same single transaction. Admittedly, the obtaining of evidence
outside of a written instrument has its difficulties both in the court room and without
it. The illegality is patent when all the facts are known; there is no contention other-
wise. Such practice has recently been made a matter of record in State of Minnesota
ex rel. Gof# v. O'Neil, doing business as Metro Loan Co.4
Disregard of statute.
An outright contract for a rate of interest in excess of that permitted by statute-
a complete disregard of the law. This practice is common in many places in the
Southwest. Many Texas banking institutions lend money at io% annually and take
out the interest at the time of making the loan, and then require equal instalment
payments. For instance, they would take out $12 from a $12o loan, and require pay-
ment in 12 equal instalments of $io each. In Oklahoma varying high percentages
are taken in utter disregard of the statutory maximum.
There still prevails in many places and in many phases of life the principle that a
man's word is more binding than his bond. The Texas loan shark openly advertises
that he makes "honor loans," i., loans made that are for the current convenience
of the borrower, but are admittedly illegal. Usury in this atmosphere is considered
a minor wrong, if a wrong at all, and the ancient equity argument prevails that a
borrower must do equity before equity grants relief.,
Maximum rates as if there were no instalments coupled witk insurance requirements.
The practice of stating maximum rates as if there were no instalments is the
flagrant violation by many personal loan departments of banks throughout the nation.
It can be said that at least half of the banks having personal loan departments are
practicing open evasion of the usury law of their state. The garb in which the trans-
actions are cloaked for such personal loans by banks is the familiar terminology of
'205 Minn. 366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939).
5 Ex pa'te Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S. W. (2d) 270 (1939). For the extent of this practice see
Berry v. City of Fort Worth, 132 Tex. 599, 124 S. W. (2d) 842 (1939); re'g 11o S. W. (2d) 95 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937).
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everyday banking practice. The loan is discounted at the customary rate within the
state, such as 5%, 6% or 8%; then substantially equal payments are required either
on the note itself or in an "account." The borrower is told he is able to borrow, say
at 50 per annum. He signs a note so reading and if he requests it, he may' get a copy
to take home with him. He is orally told that he must save systematically and, there-
fore, must make payments at regular intervals, weekly or monthly. Sometimes a
charge is made for "an insurance reserve" against loss.6
It is a truth that there is a risk inherent in every loan transaction. This is recog-
nized by everyone when there is no collateral. The conservative banking rule, if not
a fundamental requirement, is that the collateral should have a marketable value in
excess of the amount of the promise. The excess should be sufficient for a reasonable
margin of safety. The collateral is a secondary alternative right to be availed of, if
the primary promise is not fulfilled or performed.
Every borrower instinctively knows that, if he does not have collateral to meet
the above standards, he will be required customarily to do something to bring the
quality of the loan within bankable standards. The average borrower, therefore, is
willing to provide some insurance or something like insurance if so requested by a
banker. He is especially inclined to do so if he is unfamiliar with the instruments
and tools evidencing a credit transaction.
Personal loan departments of banks are recent innovations. The general public
must be informed about their practices and requirements. The members of the gen-
eral public know banks are intensely regulated credit institutions and generally
believe their officers and personnel are reliable and reputable persons. Consequently
they accept requirements in new situations without question (at least without court
contest), when the recognized credit institution demands these plausible and ob-
viously fair and just additions to bring its loans within bankable standards.
Thus in many places the unsecured loan requires an insurance policy on the life
of the borrower. This is usually a term policy. This may be by a single policy for a
single borrower, or it may be a group policy upon a group of borrowers, or it may
be a blanket policy with individual certificates. The net return in protection to the
lender is the same under any of the three plans. The cost of such protection is quite
different because of difference in work and detail. Each loan is individualistic; such
is our law, and each borrower is accustomed to think of his own credit problems and
not of himself as a member of a group or a class. Being unfamiliar with distinctions
in insurance rights and the differences between policies and certificates, he accepts
what is suggested and it unwittingly becomes his own act.
If short cuts have been taken to accomplish these ends, then there is evasion; also,
if there are participations in insurance premiums, there is evasion; or if forms and
safeguards have been omitted and a naked reserve used by the lender under the
nomenclature of "self-insurance," it is an evasion. Many times the use of an insurance
company is completely dispensed with. Practices of this sort by national banks have
'See PATo N's DiGEsr (Student's ed. 1926) 53844a.
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been frowned on in a statement of policy issued by the United States Comptroller
of Currency in September, i94o, and condemned by other authorities as well.7 One
of the best known "plans" for effectuating the practices under discussion is the
Vee Bee System which was declared "lawful" by former United States Attorney
General Homer S. Cummings, although adversely ruled upon by the above authori-
ties.8 Every bank by acceptance of its charter and use of its enabling statute under-
takes to obey the usury law of the state in which it does business.
AvoIDANCE
An act of avoidance is always in compliance with the law. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to be alert to the four elements essential to an act of usury named above. In
order to obtain an avoidance, the activity must be distinguishable as to at least one of
these elements. The distinction must be a genuine departure, constituting an actual
difference. Some of the outstanding acts of avoidance are discussed below.
Purchases of choses in action.
(A) Sales financing. The financing of a genuine sale of merchandise by allowing
the purchase price to be paid in instalments has been declared by the courts in every
state to be beyond the usury statute. The argument was presented again and again
that the seller had made no loan; he intended no loan, but had merely granted a
commercial favor to the buyer in allowing payments in instalments rather than one
lump sum. The courts have so found. However, they have overlooked the millen-
nium-old fact that an agreement to forbear is in essence as much a loan as an
extension 6f the use of a sum of money. Also they have avoided analysis of the sales
price to determine what part, if any, was compensation for forbearance. They have
generally taken the easy and popular road of finding that adequate proof has not
been made of the amount of compensation for such forbearance. Today this is the
greatest means of avoidance of the usury law throughout each of the 48 states.9
(B) Salary buying. A simple sale in anticipation of salary earned or to be earned
is beyond the usury law. Many large companies have a two-week hold-back in the
payment of wages. The employee has earned, e.g., $25 between January x and
January 14, which $25 he receives on January 28. On January 15 the salary buyer
may pay cash in the amount of $22.5o and seek his collection of $25 on January 28
from the paymaster or the employee himself. The details of this practice are brought
out in the facts and issue of law set forth in Sherrill v. Brantly.10 Salary buying is
an evil specifically regulated by every good and effective small loan statute. A small
loan statute regulates not only "interest" but every "consideration" contracted for,
collected or received by the lender."
'Att'y Gen. of Pennsylvania, Formal Opinion No. 339, Apr. 29, 1940; Mich. Banking Comm'r, Ruling,
Oct. 28, 1940. . See American Banker, July 23, 1940.
SBerger,.Usury in Instalment Sales (1935) 2 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB. 148, at 162-170.
10 334 Mo. 497, 66 S. W. (2d) 529 (1933).
"See comments infra pp. 62-63..
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Dual contracts approved by the legislature.
(A) Building and loan associations. The oldest and most renowned of the dual
contracts are those provided under the building and loan statutes. Here the effective
rate and cost to the borrower are practically doubled. The device used is a loan at
the contract rate for the entire term upon the original sum lent with interest payments
on the entire amount; and at the same time, a requirement of a purchase of a share
of stock or shares having a nominal value equal to the amount of the loan, and
requiring instalment payments of the full purchase price.' 2
(B) Morris Plan or industrial banks. The first cousin to the building and loan
principle is the Morris Plan. The difference here is" that the owner-lender is better
protected because he sells a debt piece and not a share in the business. Generally no
interest is paid on the "certificate of indebtedness" until it has been fully paid for.
In the case of most borrowers, as soon as the certificate has been paid for, it is used
to cancel the loan upon which interest has been paid for the entire term upon the
original sum lent as long as it was outstanding.' s There are other variations of this
idea often developed under a statute called "Loan and Investment Company Act."
(C) Similar corporations. A descendant of the building and loan plan is the
"similar corporation" in Georgia. The building and loan transaction is customarily
limited to purchase of real estate, and the loan is secured by a mortgage on the real
estate. The statute providing for the loan plus share-buying in the "similar corpora-
tion" does not require real estate as a part of the transaction; thus chattels and
certificates are used as collateral. Also the "subscription price" for shares (which can
be very scarce) may be at a premium.14
Collateral activities.
(A) Activity charges. This is the custom and practice of reputable banks. The
amount, separate and apart from compensation for the use, forbearance or detention
of money, is a charge for services rendered or reimbursement of expenses incurred.
A protest fee on a defaulted note is a clear example of an activities charge. Charge for
appraisal of collateral is a customary one. So far services rendered under an indenture
securing an issue of bonds is another. All of these have long been recognized as
means of additional income or profit that are incidental to a lending transaction.'g
There are many other activities of the lender which avoid the usury law for which
just and fair charges may be made.'6 However, charge for these same activities
would violate the small loan law.'
1 See Simpson v. Smith Saving Society, 178 Ark. 921, x2 S. W. (2d) 89o (1929).
" See Mesaba Loan Co. v. Sher, 203 Minn. 589, 282 N. W. 823 (1938); Columbus Industrial Bank
v. Miller, 125 Conn. 313, 6 A. (2d) 42 (1939).
" See Gore v. Industrial Loan & Savings Co., 52 Ga. App. 401, 183 S. E. 499 (1936); Peoples Bank v.
Mayo, 61 Ga. App. 877, 8 S. E. (2d) 405 (1940).
" See First National Bank v. Phares, 70 Okla. 255, 174 Pac. 519, 21 A. L. R. 793 (1918); PATON's
DIGEST (Student's ed. 1926) §§5o3, 14o8, 1776, 4464.
ae See C. C. Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S. W. 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
a
7 London Realty Co. v. Riordan, 207 N. Y. 264, 1oo N. E. 8oo (913); Capital Loan -& Savings Co. v.
Biery, 134 Ohio St. 333 (1938).
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(B) Genuine professional services. This is an age-old practice. Every small town
lawyer is accustomed to loan money either himself or for a client, and as an incident
thereto, to get the legal business of title search and drawing the mortgage. He might
also get a commission for making the loan on behalf of the lender or obtaining the
money for the borrower.15
(C) Sale of insurance. i. Insurance companies are one of the great sources of
funds for loans. They also lend money directly. Prior to i89o the universal rule was
that insurance companies could not require the borrower to take out reasonable in-
surance. Today that rule is changed and a lender may require insurance at standard
rates 19
2. Even when the insurance at standard rates was required by the lender in
excessive amounts, it was not usurious. In an Arkansas case20 an application for a
small loan license was denied because indulgence-in such a practice before the small
loan act was passed did not warrant the belief that a similar business would be
honestly, fairly and efficiently conducted to the advantage of the community.
3. In addition to taking the maximum rate of interest, the lender may require
insurance at standard rates and act as a licensed insurance broker or an insurance
agent, and retain the commission lawfully allowed. 2 '
(D) Legislative authorization recognizing incidental expense or service. This
approach is an outstanding characteristic of federal relief statutes making available
financial aid or assistance to worthy borrowers. The statutes have recognized that
appraisals were essential; that title searches had to be made for liens and delinquent
taxes; and that papers had to be drawn and filed. Lastly, and maybe more important
than any other feature, it was recognized that the lender could do, or cause to be
done, these various activities cheaper than anyone else or any independent third party
or group of third parties. These statutes fixed maximum allowances for these
things.22 ,
(E) Florida Limited Surety Companies. The first known attempt by "high rate"
lenders of small sums and makers of midget loans to avoid both usury statutes and
small loan acts by a special insurance device has taken place in Florida within the
last two years. In that state the surety insurance companies are now authorized to:
"become sureties and guarantors upon bonds, obligations, contracts and agreements, and
may become sureties upon bonds in judicial proceedings whether criminal or civil." (Italics
supplied.)
"Houghton v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161 (x913); Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 Pac. 946, 62
A. L. R. 1341 (1927).
'
9 Heaberlin v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., x4 W. Va. 198, x7 S. E. 419 (1933).
Jernigan v. Loid Rainwater Co., 196 Ark. 251, 117 S. W. (2d) x8 (1938).
21Niles v. Kavanagh, 179 Cal. 98, 175 Pac. 462 (1918). Also see California Personal Property Brokers
Act, Laws 1939, C. 952, §20.
"
5 Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, c. 64, §x, 48 STAT. 128 (1933), x2 U. S. C. §1462; National Hous-
ing Act, 48 STAT. 1246 (x934), 12 U. S. C. §170; Federal Home Loan Bank Act, c. 522, §1, 47 STAT. 725
(932), 12 U. S. C. §1422; production credit companies under the Farm Credit Administration, 50 STAT.
5 (1937), 12 U. S. C. §Io2oi-o (Supp. 1940); Disaster Loan Act, 5o STAT. i9 (1937), 15 U. S. C.
§6osk-x (Supp. 1940).
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The special bill was introduced without these features being stressed in the 1939
legislative session and was enacted under the belief by the Florida authorities that it
was in aid and furtherance of bail bonds. The language would indicate that bail
bonds were secondary among the objects of this statute. Its true character and sig-
nificance were recently discovered by Roll Nugent, Director of Consumer Credit
Studies at the Russell Sage Foundation.
2 3
Brokerage.
This is the charge made when a third party is a go-between between the borrower
and the lender in negotiating the loan. With regard to this practice the courts have
often declared a relationship to be different from that claimed and asserted by the
parties. However, when the broker is genuine and the relationship exists in truth,
the charge is good.
24
Exceptions to the usury statute itself by the legislature.
(A) Credit unions. These are of two kinds: (i) the state credit union, which is
made an out-and-out exception to the usury law by fiat of the state legislature as in
New York,2 5 and New Jersey; 26 and (2) federal credit unions.27 It has been declared
that such federal credit unions are immune from the state usury law because it is a
federal instrumentality and state sovereignty cannot interfere.
28
(B) Small loan acts. These laws rest upon various theories and principles of gov-
ernment. i. A direct exemption from the usury statute b r granting an extraordinary
interest rate in the form of special privilege. This is the Roman idea-or as it might
be called today the Fascist, Nazi or Communist idea-that the state may give
and the state may take away. Illinois, Iowa and Missouri have such statutes providing
for an extraordinary rate of interest with all other legitimate charges denied.
2. Retention of the limits of the usury statute and control over collateral activities
in the form of a limitation of inherent rights. This is the English idea-which today
might be called the democratic idea. Blackstone expressed it when he said, interest
rates "alike for all. '2 9 This theory would keep the same rate of interest and limit
charges for other services either by fixed fees, as Nebraska and Colorado, or within
a general overall limitation, as Tennessee and New Mexico.
(C) Special statutes for particular classifications. i. Personal Loan Departments
of Banks whose rates are regulated by special statutes, such as those in New York by
Sections 114a and 2ooa of the Banking Law; and those in New Jersey under Chaptel
238 of the Laws of 1936.
"' Fla. Laws 1939, c. 518. See especially §xo. Mr. Nugent's observations are set Lirt in a letter to
J. M. Lee, Florida State Comptroller, Sept. 11, 1940.
£4 Houghton v. Burden, supra note 1S; Niles v. Kavanagh, supra note x8.
4 N. Y. CoNSOL. LAws (McKinney, 1937), art. XI, §§450-480.
"N. J. REv. STAT. (1937), tit. 17, sub-tide 2, pt. 2, C. 12, art. x-16.
2" 48 STAT. 1216 (1934), 12 U. S. C. §§1751-1770.
" See principles set forth in Tiffany v. National Bank of the State of Missouri, 85 U. S. 409 (1873);
Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank of Buffalo v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29 (875); Evans v. National
Bank of Savannah, 251 U. S. 1o8 (1919). 2 2 COMMENTARIES, c. 30.
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2. Consumer Discount Companies in Pennsylvania. To take advantage of this
statute a company must qualify with the Secretary of Banking. By so qualifying it
is entitled to lend amounts of money not in excess of $iooo and discount the interest
for the full term of the loan at 6%10 per annum, even though it may require the
amount of the loan to be repaid in substantially equal instalments over the term of
the loan. Such a requirement practically doubles the interest or makes it about 12%
per annum.30
3. Provident Loan Associations. These companies are authorized by statute or by
special charters combining a special rate of interest or a particular schedule of charges,
or both. They are semi-philanthropic. They are often limited dividend companies.
Their characteristics vary from state to state and sometimes different rights and pro-
cedures are provided for in the same state. The companies in New York City, Detroit,
Minneapolis and Dallas are outstanding examples.
WHERE AVOIDANCE ToucHEs EVASION AND MAY BECOME EVASION
Activities based both on the general principles of common law and the rights of
legislative enactment slip from time to time and from situation to situation into either
avoidance or evasion, or both, of usury statutes. Some illustrations follow:
Hazard agreements.
It will be recalled that one of the essential elements of usury was "a fixed obliga-
tion to pay." This meant that the obligation must be certain and not founded upon a
genuine contingency. Bottomry and respondentia were founded upon the con-
tingency of the hazards of the sea and of trade. The payment of compensation for
these kinds of advances of credit was not "interest" and, therefore, could not be
usurious. The "hazard agreement" is based upon this broad idea. An advance is
made, a promise of payment is given conditioned upon such things as: (x) living
until due date; (2) not losing an arm or leg or both; (3) having no auto accident;
(4) that the auto would be neither stolen, nor .wrecked, nor have its engine frozen;
(5) and many other such things specified; and if the contingency should happen,
then notice within 24 hours is required. Theoretically these are risks, but in reality
the risks are negligible and without substance.31 It has been held such agreements
were merely camouflage used in an effort to disguise a loan. The disguise failed.
Repeated purchases of salary.
An honest and true purchase of wages of an employee is not a loan and can not
be usurious.32 However, the gross profit made on such a transaction is declared by
0 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939), tit. 7, c. 27, §§76X-i-i9.
1 Doyle v. American Loan Co., 185 Ark. 233, 46 S. W. (2d) 803 (1932); Stuback v. Sussman, 281
N. Y. 719, 23 N. E. (2d) 544 (1939) 256 App. Div. 903, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 141 (1938); Equity Service
Corp. v. Agull, 250 App. Div. 96, 293 N. Y. S. 872 (1937), rev'g 158 Misc. 78o (Sup. Ct. 1936). Cf.
Smith v. Orr, 33 Pa. D.,& C. 689 (1938).3 2 Supra p. 58.
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the small loan act to be deemed to be interest for the application of that statute.P3
Regardless of any small loan statute, such repeated purchases have been declared to
be loans and attempted evasions of the usury law, 4 while in Florida the legality of
such practice has been held to be a jury question with unlawful intention a necessary
element of illegality3 5 This Florida rule of law makes each case stand alone and
results in no practical enforcement of either usury law or small loan act in such
cases.
36
Guarantee or endorsements.
This is a simple and separate guarantee of a note by a friend for a consideration,
or even by a straightforward company for a premium or a fee, which would not be
considered interest on the loan. However, when it is merely a part of a circuitous
route of a lender in making a loan, any consideration paid for such guarantee or
endorsement to the lender's alter ego becomes a part of the interest, and the entire
transaction is tainted with usury. The remedies for usury apply3 This is a common
camouflage for illegal lenders. It is practiced in the province of Quebec, Canada,
and in Texas, and in many American states between these places3 8 This device is
good in form and, if genuine, is lawful. It has its legal basis in the inherent rights
accorded individuals by the common law, while Florida "limited surety companies"
rely upon legislative authorization.
Merchandise coupons.
This is a variation of legitimate collateral agreements. Here the lender sells a
coupon which "may be redeemed if the borrower will expend a further sum to buy
merchandise. This merchandise may be groceries, clothes or other necessities. Many
times it is luxuries which the ordinary borrower of small sums cannot afford. The
coupon then becomes a blind to conceal a further profit. Ostentatiously the borrower
is the voluntary purchaser of a book of coupons which may be used to pay for
merchandise. If it was honest and straightforward, this plan is approved by the
courts. Such a state of facts was in the stipulations or admitted by demurrer in the
"J annett v. Hardie, 290 U. S. 6o2 (1933), affg Jannett v. Windham, xo9 Fla. 129, 147 So. 296
(1933); Dunn v. Ohio, 282 U. S. 8o (1930), 122 Ohio 431, 172 N. E. 148 (1930); Sweat v. Common-
wealth, 152 Va. 1041, 148 S. E. 744 (I929); Palmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 156 Md. 4, 142 At. 495
(1928).
" McWhite v. State, 143 Tenn. 222, 226 S. '. 542 (1921); Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S. W. 135 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1919), af'g i6o S. W. 597; (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184
Ga. 617, 192 S. E. 217 (1937).
"Davidson v. Davis, 59 Fla. 476, 521 So. 139 (191o); Edwards v. State, 62 Fla. 40, 56 So. 401
(19x); Clark v. Grey, xoi Fla. xo58, 132 So. 832 (1931). See also State ex rel. Moore v. Gillian and
Cobb, trading as Local Finance Co., 193 So. 751 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1940).
" See KILGORE, 240% LOAN SHARK RACKET (940) 116.
"Farrell v. Kelly (Liberty Guaranty Co.), Tenn. Sup. Ct. Docket No. Davidson Equity No. 11
(1939).
"Also see Penziner v. West American Finance Co., 133 Cal. App. 578, 24 P. (2d) 50 (1933), 10
Cal. (2d) 16o, 74 P. (2d) 252 (1937); and Wolf v. Pacific Southwest Discount Corp., 10 Cal. (2d) x83,
74 P. (2d) 263 (1937).
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test cases of Hogan v. Thompson,39 Page v. Johnson°4 0 and Hornsby v. Rush.41
However, in i94o Judge Rice of the Alabama Court of Appeals discovered the
Hornsby case was being used as a blind to deceive the victims of illegal lenders, and
he wrote a very able opinion declaring the practice of that particular lender usurious
and illegal in the case of Willis v. Buchman, doing business as Alabama Loan Co.4 2
The case has been appealed on other grounds and is now pending a second rehearing
before the Supreme Court of Alabama. The practice has been declared bad in the
Texas case of Glover v. Buchman,4 and likewise in the lower courts of Kentucky
and Ohio.
Store order plan.
The very name of this plan would indicate it was lawful on its face. This is a
variation of the merchant coupon system and is done on the store order basis after
the fashion of the past generation of a shopper on a commission basis. However, this
device is used by ingenious illegal lenders to avoid both the usury law and the small
loan act. Here the lender purports to lend money for nothing or the customary con-
tract rate. The lender's real profit is not obtained directly from the borrower, but
indirectly from his failure to exercise his rights with the merchant or from the
merchant. The store order practice having the best finesse is the kind of situation
described in Cash Service Co. v. Ward.4 Here the miner oi" railroad employee was
subject to a two-week hold-back in wages. To illustrate, he had earned $25 the two
weeks ending November 3o, but he could not get this until December 15. The
lender offered and did advance him $22.50 in ordinary check plui $2.50 in accompany-
ing coupon for a store order. The whole could be used at almost any store in town
to purchase $25.oo merchandise at regular prices. If not used together, the $2.50
coupon was valueless; if so used, the merchant paid the lender a commission of $2.50.
The lender claimed he advanced money to the borrower-miner for nothing, therefore
he was not subject to either the usury law or the small loan act. It was held he
received a benefit in excess of 6%o per annum and, in truth, about 26o% per annum.
The Cash Service opinion contains an excellent analysis of both benefit and detriment
theories of consideration and interest.
Cash order plan.
This is another scheme that appears innocent on its face. Here the outward prac-
tice is the giving of checks after the style of letters of credit or travellei checks, and
a fee is paid for each check used. It is declared that no loan has been made although
there is a tacit understanding that the used check will not be repaid until next pay day.
Here the element of a loan and a period of time is declared non-existent. In a friendly
contested case involving this plan with alleged facts uncontradicted, it was found that
no loan had been made and that the fees were for services and not compensation for
89 x86 Ark. 497, 54 S. W. (2d) 303 (932). 40 174 Okla. 516, 5! P. (2d) 301 (1932).
4126 Ala. App. 170, 155 So. 637 (1934). "' Oct. 1939, Ct. of App.
48104 S. W. (2d) 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 44 n8 W. Va. 703, 192 S. E. 244 (1937).
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the use, forbearance or detention of money." Clearly on the facts before the court
the case was correctly decided, but it is submitted that if there had been a fuller
presentation of facts, it would have been found to be a violation of the usury statute.
Deceptive forms of purchase and sale.
.This device is gray with age. It is, however, currently used very extensively. A
recent large scale of operations disclosed a system of agents who purported to buy
and sell autos and then sell the paper to a bona fide purchaser for value when trans-
ferring it to their principal. The agent is called a "bird dog" because he points out
his victim to the illegal lender. The agent purported to buy and then lease to the
victim his own auto, promising that after so many payments the car would again
belong to its owner. He would then transfer the lease to the lender-principal. The
collection is effected by threat of seizure of the mortgaged auto, and if the threat is
not sufficient, then seizure on the street or at night and transportation of the car to
another state is made.46 However, where another was the real lender and there
actually were two transactions, it was held there was no loan.47
Alleged attorney fees on small loans.
This is another of the ancient practices.4 8 Here the lawyer is the lender and he
charges a fee to draft a note for a small sum. The fee is excessive for the value of the
service. In those places where standard minimum fees are approved by the bench or
the bar, or both, it is put into use with great ease. It may be grossly abused in con-
nection with small loans. It works, however, in every small community. It was used
extensively in Canada throughout the Dominion by means of a loophole in the
Canadian Money-lender's Act. The practice was recently discovered and successfully
prosecuted in Hartford, Connecticut, in State v. Haymond, doing business as Colonial
Discount Corporation.9 Twenty-five years ago it was the common practice in every
New England town.49 . Today in the South it is an incident to "paper shaving." In
California on a large loan where the fee was genuine and fair for services rendered,
it was approved °
Abuse of minimum fees allowed by statute.
The Industrial Banking Act or Morris Plan Statute, as it is commonly called,
provides for an investigation fee of $2 for each Sioo or fraction thereof lent. The
wording of this allowance is important. The principle of such allowance is good,
,' Cash Order Corp. v. McCann, Circuit Court of Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, 1938.
"
8 Personal Finance Co. of New York v. General Finance Co., 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 582, 3 A. (2d) 174
(1938); State of Maryland v. Dashiell trading as Liberty Loan Co., Circuit Court of-Wicomico County,
Salisbury, Md., 1939; State v. Newell, Schenectady Police Court, New York, decided Feb. 5, 1938; State v.
Fialkoff, Albany Police Court, New York, decided Feb. 10, 1938; State v. Gallup, Albany Police Court,
New York, decided April 1938.
,
T People v. Sacks, 276 N. Y. 321, 12 N. E. (2d) 425 (1938).
,8 See supra p. 6o.
"Superior Ct., Hartford, Conn., decided Oct. 25, 1939.
"" See editorial, Hartford Daily Courant, Oct. 26, 1940.
SWallae v. Zinman, supra note 15.
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right and proper. However, it is currently becoming the haven for unscrupulous
lenders of midget loans for a short term and leads to repeated transactions coveiing a
single continuous indebtedness. The lender makes $io and $20 loans for two weeks,
and thus finds legal sanction for the typical "high rate" practice of 26o per annum.
This is done by making loans for a period not exceeding two weeks. Each time $2 is
charged, and the loan is $20 or less. Two dollars is io% of $20. This may be done 26
times during the year. The gross is 26o% per annum, and if the loan is $io, it would
be 520% per annum. It can be seen that the "five for six boys"51 thus find legislative
authorization for their business. This loophole was closed in California by Senate
Bill No. 6i of the Laws of i94o. It threatens serious trouble because of extensive abuse
in the states of Washington and Utah, and is a potential trouble spot in many states.
The leaders of industrial banking should correct this sore spot before it festers.
Dollar minimum in banking law.
This can lead to the same kind of abuse as described in the preceding paragraph.
However, it is based on either the banking law or the general usury statute. Many
states have an exception to the banking law that permits a dollar minimum payment
for interest on small loan balances. This provides an open sesame for lenders on
short-term midget loans and made it possible to carry on a high-rate loan business
of 26o annually by making two-week loans of $io and $20 and making it possible
for the husband and wife to alternate biweekly the victims between themselves as
separate lenders.52
Use of Morris Plan practice without approval of legislature.
The Morris Plan system of dual contracts (loan contract and simultaneous pur-
chase of investment certificate) is used in Tennessee and Oklahoma as a means of
evading the constitutional limitations of interest without legislative approval. In
Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas and California there is a limit of io% interest
annually in the state constitution. This practice has been held bad in State v.
Whaley,53 and was found usurious in En'gland v. Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. in
the Chancery Court at Knoxville, Tennessee on April 26, i9 39 .r" Later an appeal
was taken and subsequently dismissed by the appellant. The real reason for the
dismissal is believed to be fear of an adverse decision sustaining the lower court
findings and conclusions of law, as well as fear of publicity from a printed opinion in
the reports to that effect. Likewise violation was admitted by default in McConnell v.
Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. in Memphis, Tennessee, in the Chancery Court of
Shelby County, docket No. 43oo3, on January 3, 1938. In Stephenson v. Fidelity Loan
& Thrift Corp., decided June, 1939, by Chancellor Swepston in the Chancery Court of
Shelby County, such a transaction was declared a single contract at usurious interest,
alSupra p. 55.
See opinion of Attorney General of West Virginia dated May x8, 1936, Homer A. Holt, Att'y Gen,
by Ira J. Partlow, Ass't.
a 139 S. W. (2d) 255 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1939). ...Knox County, Docket No. 27761.
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and not one contract of loan and a separate contract for instalment purchase of
an investment certificate. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals during
August 194o and there is now pending a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court
of Tennessee.
All of these cases bear out the usurious character of such efforts when done with-
out legislative approval. Since Tennessee has constitutional limitations, it may well
be that a legislative act might be unconstitutional.54 Likewise, the precedents of the
agreed test cases on stipulations or demurrer have availed these illegal operations
nothing to date. 5
Pawnbroker exception used in Utah.
By means of definitions in city ordinances a workable evasion was established
until the Utah Banking Department set its energies to eliminate this abuse. Its acts
and results are described in the Department's 194o Biennial Report at page io in the
following words:
"Prior to x938 and particularly during the early part of 1938, this department was faced
with a serious loan situation throughout the state. For some time past there were quite a
number of salary loan offices operating within the state in. addition to the legitimate small
loan agencies operating under and pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah and duly
licensed and supervised by the banking department. The latter companies are permitted
by law to loan in amounts not exceeding $300 and to charge interest at the rate of 3% per
month on unpaid balances. The former type, the salary loan offices, commonly designated
as 'loan sharks' were operating under various subterfuges, some with city licenses and some
with no licenses at all. This type of company was loaning as a rule amounts from $5 to
$5o and were charging anywhere from 5% to 20% per month or as much more as they
thought the traffic would bear. Prior to this time representatives of this department called
on these salary loan offices and made demand that they apply for licenses from this depart-
ment and thus come under the regulations of the law and this office. However, none of
these so-called 'loan shark' offices did apply for licenses and continued to charge their
exorbitant rates of interest.
"After several complaints were made to this office with respect to the operations of
these unlicensed lenders, the situation was directed to the attention of Harold W. Wallace,
County Attorney. He was instrumental in causing many complaints to be issued followed
by numerous arrests and prosecutions. Frequently these companies would appear by their
agents. The companies were not incorporated and were operating in most cases under the
name of a certain individual doing business under a company name. When an arrest was
made, the individual would come into court, would enter his plea of guilty, pay his fine
and then would disappear and some other agent would move in and conduct the business,
and so in this way evade the law-being content to pay the fine rather than to discontinue
business or to comply with the law by procuring a license from this department and be
subject to the strict regulations of the small loan act.
"The prosecutions by Mr. Wallace's office became so numerous and the expense so great
to these unlicensed operators that they finally struck upon another idea to try and evade
the law. They were successful in procuring the passage by the Board of City Commis-
"' Connor v. Minier, io9 Cal. App. 770, 288 Pac. 23 (1930).
"First Industrial Loan Corp. v. Price, Chancery Court, Davidson County, Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 18,
1939; Stone v. Provident Loan & Discount Corp., Chancery Court, Shelby County, Memphis, Tenn.,
Dec. 1939.
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sioners of Salt Lake City of a certain ordinance designated as Section 1, Chapter 28,
Revised Ordinance of Salt Lake City, 1934, as amended, by adding to said Chapter a new
section known as Chapter 667X. By this ordinance they sought to have their business
designated as pawnbrokers, and by this subterfuge hoped to be able to continue making
their charges at the high rates, free from any regulation or supervision by the banking
department, inasmuch as duly licensed pawnbrokers were exempt from the provisions of
the small loan act and of course not subject to our regulations. Again this office in co-
operation with Harold E. Wallace, County Attorney of Salt Lake County, commenced to
systematically prosecute these cases, with the result that the 'loan sharks' faced with the
possibility of continuous prosecutions for violation of the state law and faced further with
the possibility of losing the principal sum of their loans, together with the interest that
might become due thereon, decided to abide by the decision of-the courts in this matter
and in order to test the law and the constitutionality and legality of the ordinance referred
to, arrests were made in the case of State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs. E. Z. Loan Company,
Defendant; and in the case of State of Utah, vs. A.. U. Daniels, Defendant. These cases
were tried in the City Court of Salt Lake City. They were prosecuted by Mr. Wallace's
office and conviction was obtained in the City Court. From this conviction an appeal was
taken- to the District Court and the matter was heard before the Honorable Roger I. Mc-
Donough, one of the judges of the District Court. Briefs were submitted by the said
County Attorney's office and also by the Defendants. The matter was taken under advise-
ment by the Honorable Judge McDonough and judgment was rendered by the Court
upholding the decision of the City Court and sustaining the conviction. The defendants
did not see fit to appeal to the Supreme Court and their convictions stood. These and all
other companies similarly operating, due to the pressure brought upon them and due to
court decisions against them decided to quit business or to sell out to legitimate licensed
lenders and give up this field of operation, and we know of none now operating."
Use of hazard fee authorized by Missouri statute.
The Missouri Loan and Investment Companies Act,50 authorizes a hazard charge
of $20 for a loan secured by a motor vehicle.
The report of the Small Loan Committee of the Missouri Bar for September 1940
declares that this fee is "a strange quirk" and is being abused and results in excessive
charges to borrowers. It illustrates its report with a number of cases. The following
is a description of one case:
"An employee of a manufacturing company on February 5, 1938, went to the office of
a loan and investment company in Kansas City for the purpose of making a $50.00 loan.
He was successful. He received the sum of $46.49 in cash and signed a note for $70.00 to
be repaid in semi-monthly installments over a period of six months. The charges, accord-
ing to the lender, totaled $23.51 of which $2o.oo was hazard fee, $2.00 investigation fee
and $1-.51 interest. The borrower had repaid a total of $40.0o by the end of five months
but he was somewhat behind in his payments. Accordingly, on June 13, 1938 he renewed
the loan, received $13.00 in cash, received a credit of $3.00 on his old balance of $30.00,
thereby making the total amount to be financed $40.00 for which he signed a new note
for $6o.oo also payable in semi-monthly installments over a period of six months from
date. By July 30, 1938 this borrower had occasion to need another small sum and he
received $io.oo from the company for which he signed a $S6.oo note to be repaid over a
period of two and one-half 'months. He apparently was unable to make his payments
"'Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) art. 8, c. 32, as amended by Laws 1933, P. 199.
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promptly because on August 13, 1938, he consolidated these two loans after having paid
only $15.00 on the $6o.oo and nothing on the $16.oo note. On that date he received $50.95
cash to which was added the net balances of the other two loans of $43.85 and $15.2o; for
these he signed a note for $i56.oo to be repaid in semi-monthly installments over a period
of a year from August, 1938. By the first of February, 1939, just about six months later,
he had paid on this newest loan, a total of $42.00, but he was delinquent. Again he re-
financed, received $2o.oo in cash and signed a new note for $152.00. On this he made only
one payment of $6.5o and before February, 1939 had passed, his 1934 Model A Ford
Coupe was repossessed for a claimed balance of $i45.5o. In a period of a year this man
received $140.44 in cash, repaid a total of $IX3.50, thereby leaving a principal balance of
only $26.94, but according to the method of refinancing used by this company and claimed
by it to be permitted by the Loan and Investment Companies Act, he still owed over
$145.oo. The total charges tacked on to the amount received by this borrower reached the
staggering total of $i27.51. This Committee thinks that a law is wrong if it permits a
lender, over a period of one year, to charge $127.00 for the use of $140.00."
Recently, during 194o, the Missouri Supreme Court held Such a business under this
act bad in State ex inf. Roy McKittrick, Attorney General v. Universal Finance
Company.67
INTERSTATE AND NATIONAL AsPECTS OF EVASION OR AVOIDANCE OF
STATE USURY STATUTES
This business of illegal lending of small sums of money is not only conducted by
the petty usurer, the "vest pocket" lender, the back-door and back-stairs lender, but
also by great interstate or nation-wide groups. As in every business, there are lenders
and satellites, and varying degrees of independence, allegiance and interrelation.
It is said of one foremost lender and leader among these in 1940 that he does not
even know where all his offices and agents are. His operations are so extensive and
so scattered, as well as so greatly camouflaged and hidden as not to be always dis-
cernible by him. He is presumedly retired, and the business is presumedly conducted
by his associates. He has a right hand and a left hand and the "one knoweth not
what the other doeth." The right hand obeys the law, or at least pretends to obey; the
left hand uses the law only as a place of hiding in its game of hide-and-seek. The
right hand has its legal advisor and banker in staid New England; the left hand has
its nerve centers scattered in Miami, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; Nashville, Ten iessee;
Houston, Texas; Salt Lake City, Utah; Denver, Colorado; and Los Angeles, Califor-
nia. This huge organization of the left uses every legal form known, such as the
corporation, trust, association, partnership, individual, individual with trade name,
leased property, out of state owners and holders of tide, agents, traveling auditors,
nominal loans with what may be called minus equities or mere understandings. It
works for an alliance with local political forces and even with personages of state-wide
importance and influence. It purports to be "home people" wherever it has the
opportunity. It uses all of the principles of evasion and avoidance that have been
heretofore described.
t No. 37294.
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For evidence of the interstate aspects of evasion or avoidance of state usury laws
it is suggested that the following materials be examined:
A. The pending suit of the Attorney General of Texas against the Miller Management
Company of Nashville, Tennessee, for $19o,ooo alleged franchise taxes. Docket No. 63699,
District Court of Travis County, 53rd Judicial District of Texas. The newspapers advise
the pleadings have been amended during November, 194o, by adding 36 additional places
of business.
B. The action of the Attorney General of Nebraska to wind up four companies al-
legedly supervised by the Miller Management Company in Nebraska, with the following
names: Industrial Finance Company, Prairie Loan Company, Standard Finance Company,
South Side Finance Company, in the District Court in and for Douglas County, Nebraska,
Docket No. 352, No. 240.
C. The Florida 240% loan racket described by John Kilgore in his book and article
in this symposium.58
D. The investigation of illegal lending activities in Austin, Texas, as set forth in the
lower court hearings, and out of which the case of Ex parte Hughes,5 9 grew.
E. The denial of personal property brokers license by the Commissioner of Corporations
in California. In the Matter of Pyramid Finance Corporation, Coastal Finance Corporation
and i9 others, before the Commissioner of Corporations of California, File No. 69850
LA, etc., October 7, 1939.
F. The action for an accounting described in National Accounting Co. v. Dorman.00
Each mentioned case sets out a particular device or group of devices to evade or avoid
the usury law of a state. It should be remembered that these practices have been going on
for a long time. Note the date of King v. State, 7r S. E. io93, 136 Ga. 709 (19xi); Spicer
P. King Bros. & Co., 136 Tenn. 408, x89 S. W. 865 (1916).
There are other well-established interstate systems, smaller and specializing in
particular devices. A quo warranto proceedings is now under way in Texas against
one of these groups. Its leader is the author of the recently rejected Vee Bee system;, 1
he is also presently a defendant in Alabama, Arkansas and Texas. Another, a de-
fendant in the Supreme Court of Georgia in State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Investment
Co., decided December 6, 1940 is well known for his activities in Missouri and Ken-
tucky. Another has his problems in six or seven states, especially in Nebraska and
Kansas. Then there are many lesser figures in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennes-
see, Texas, Arkansas, Nebraska, Idaho, Montana and the Dakotas, with operations
in five or six states. At present, the Carolinas are becoming the foremost and out-
standing "happy hunting ground" for these operators and the practice of their devices,
with renowned and reliable local political immunity from effective enforcement.
The fact that usury is not a crime in some states has been used in an effort to
avoid the penalties of the law as in State ex rel. Beck v. Basham,0 2 where this abstract
legal plea did not work. It was, however, a successful argument by a Texas lender
doing business in Washington State in getting the case of Roy Graupman V.
"B KILGORE, op. cit. supra note 36 passim. "' Supra note 5.
do Xi Fed. Supp. 872 (1935), af'd, 295 U. S. 718 (1935).
"
1 See p. 58 supra. 62 146 Kan. 181, 70 P. (2d) 24 (1937).
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Danner63 settled, and has from time to time been a means of ameliorating, if not
avoiding the penalties of usury.
Usury laws and some of their pains and penalties have been evaded and avoided
in notable cases by staying outside of the state where the usury was performed.
A. When an attempt was made in 1933 in North Carolina to prosecute Harry Drake
of Chicago he was quoted in the papers as saying that he would spend every cent he had
to keep from coming to trial in North Carolina. After having reference to the extradition
proceedings carried in big headlines in the Chicago Tribune and other papers he apparently
considered the attendant publicity was not worth the profit. He entered a plea of guilty
to the charges against him in the Wake County Superior Court, paid a $3000 fine, $Iooo
in costs and $7500 in license fees.64 It is said he sold about 200 illegal offices in North
Carolina to the operators of the largest group of such lenders in the United States.
B. In 1938 and 1939 attempts were made to prosecute W. L. Moore of Dallas in the
Pulaski County Circuit Court, Little Rock, Arkansas. The criminal action is still pending,
but the extradition has been allowed to expire for lack of sustenance. It has been reported
that the local manager will plead guilty and be fined. In which case it may be presumed
that his employer will pay the fine and the case will be closed.
C. The three Gorson brothers of Philadelphia were indicted in the Wicomico County
Circuit, Salisbury, Maryland, during 1939. It was alleged that they used the "bird dog"
system above described.65 It was found, after a formal extradition hearing in Harrisburg,
that they were in no wise "at fault." In fact, "the testimony was in their favor." Their
routine is partially described in Personal Finance Company of New York v. General
Finance Company.66 Their organization is somewhat described in General Finance Com-
pany v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,6" and Waggaman v. General Finance C0.671
A game of the illegal lenders with interstate and nation-wide connections who seek
continued evasion and avoidance of usury laws is to assist the "good elements" of the
community in discovering and eliminating the persons who prey upon the borrowers
of midget loans. They join the crusade against these cancerous abuses; they even
contribute funds for that purpose. In addition to eliminating some of their "small
fry" competition their purpose is to learn what is going on and then to do "the
necessary" to protect their business. It is a kind of fifth column activity. It has
happened recently in Memphis, Tennessee, and more or less throughout that state.
Such a procedure ended up in Pensacola, Florida, in a Supreme Court case, Staie ex
rel. Moore v. Gillian and Cobb-trading as Local Finance Co.68 Apparently some one
never understood how this fake play became real and why it was not abandoned by
the victims in the lower court.
When bar associations have sought to aid victims of the various devices considered,
charges have been made against them on the ground of champerty, and the like.
At least the claim was made that such organized assistance in free clinics was un-
e3 Docket No. 104148, Superior Court, Spokane, Wash.
o' Charlotte (N. C.) Observer, Sept. 12, 1933, p. 1x, col. 8, p. 13, col. x.
" See p. 65 supra.
:'Supra note 42. 7 .32 B. T. A. 949.
"' Decided by United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Nov. 27, 1940. See 9
U. S. L. W. 2347, Dec. 17, 1940. e8SUpra note 35.
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ethical.69 In Georgia the complaint was taken to court and the issue decided adversely
to the plaintiff by the Georgia Supreme Court in Gunnells, trading as Acme Finance
Co. v. Atlanta Bar Association, on December 6, 1940. It may be assumed that every
trick and device will be used to the limit to stop or at least delay enforcement of
usury laws, and to avoid their consequences, when the possibility of enforcement
becomes real.
The use of the mails is made by this large business of illegal lending. The mails
may not be used to commit a fraud, such use being a crime.70 Most of these operators
use the mails for a system of reports, for collection letters and as a means of seeking
new business. Clearly it is no fraud to use the mails to make illegal loans if the
borrower understands the terms thereof. However, if the mails are used to make false
representations which may be relied upon, and which are untrue, and which will
result in a fraud, then another question is presented. Evasions through the mails
that constitute fraud or are a part of the fraud are federal crimes.7 1 It is believed
frauds may be worked both forward or backward.
While federal laws themselves may be used for attacking the loan shark, the
federal framework makes it possible to carry out many of his activities in evading or
avoiding state usury laws. The refusal of extradition for misdemeanors as part of
comity between the states, e.g., greatly aids the evasion and avoidance of the usury
laws by the big interstate or nation-wide operators.
A good small loan statute breaks up this evasion or avoidance by leaving no
technical loopholes. It must be like a chicken fence without a single hole or the fence
is no good. It will have state-wide enforcement through a single person who is able
to follow not only the local ramifications and camouflages, but also state, interstate,
and nation-wide concealments and devices of evasion and avoidance.
"See Advisory Opinion on Ethics No. 141 of Oklahoma State Bar, (Sept. 1938) 8 OKLA. STATE B. ).
76, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 401.
10 U. S. CrIM. CODE 1215, 35 STAT. 1130 (909), 18 U. S. C. S338.
" U. S. v. Zalewski, 29 Fed. Supp. 755 (1940).
